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　Japan was one of the countries hit hardest by the financial crisis of 
2008. The rate of trade reduction is about 50%, which is almost the 
highest among major countries. Based on the factors suggested by lit-
erature, this study reexamines the determinants of exports and im-
ports during the great trade collapse by using Japanese macro-eco-
nomic monthly data. It also attempts to add two modifications: one is 
to introduce a new measure of the constraint of trade finance, and the 
other is to take the exchange rate into consideration since the sharp 
appreciation of the yen is contrasted to the depreciation of other cur-
rencies. As empirical results imply, demand contraction is the most 
important factor of the Japanese trade collapse, and disruption of ver-
tical linkages follows. Although the sample size is small, this study 
also detects some roles of yen appreciation and constraint of trade fi-
nance in the unprecedented decline of Japanese trade. （JEL Classifica-
tion code: F14, F31）
Abstract
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1. Introduction
　During most of the post-war era, the world trade grew at a higher pace 
than the world GDP. In 2008 and 2009, when the financial crisis and severe 
economic recession triggered by the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy took 
place, however, the world trade substantially decreased, especially com-
pared to the world GDP. This reduction was historically enormous and 
thus it is called “the Great Trade Collapse” in economic literature. Feen-
stra （2011） mentions that the ratio of world trade relative to the world 
GDP fell by nearly 30 percent in these years and became the highest 
among the recessions in the past 60 years. Using quarterly data, Bems, 
Johnson, and Yi （2011） show that while the real world GDP fell by 3.7 per-
cent, the real world trade also fell by 15 percent between the two years.
　Japanese economy was not the exception as it experienced rather dras-
tic decreases in GDP and trade as well. From the second quarter of 2008 
to the first quarter of 2009, the real GDP decreased by 8.1 percent, while 
exports and imports both fell by 35.7 percent and by 14.4 percent in real 
terms. The declining paces of trade were particularly fast in recent years. 
These huge contractions become more pronounced when we look at the 
monthly data. Figure 1 plots Japanese total trade with the world. Both ex-
ports and imports plunged from over 7 trillion yen in August of 2008 to 
below 4 trillion yen in February of 2009. The corresponding declining 
rates were 50 percent for exports and 53 percent for imports.
　Regarding the explanations of the great trade collapse, 4 major factors 
have been summarized: recession of demand for durable goods, inventory 
adjustments, disruption of vertical linkages, and constraint of trade fi-
nance. In the past studies, the explanation trade financial constraint has 
provided does not have much credit （Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2010）. 
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Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein （2011） and Amiti and Weinstein （2011）, how-
ever, suggest that there should be important connections between exports 
and their financiers. In the context of Japanese export in particular, it is 
highly considerable that the financing conditions of banks affect exports, 
since the Japanese banking sector underwent integration and operates un-
der the low or zero interest-rate policy.
　It should be also noticed that after the financial crisis, the Japanese yen 
appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 16.4 percent （from August 2008 to 
February 2009）. This shows a clear contrast with other major countries’ 
experiences: For example, the both euro and the British pound depreciat-
ed against the U.S. dollar. Combined with the movement of trade, one 
would naturally wonder that the yen appreciation may have had impacts 
on the reduction of exports during the great trade collapse, but not so 
Figure 1.  Japanese Total Exports and Imports with World: January 2008 - De-
cember 2010
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics of Japan
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many studies try to research on the role of exchange rate changes.
　Therefore, this study aims at investigating the factors of Japanese trade 
collapse in line with the literature at hand, with particular focus on the 
roles of trade finance and yen appreciation, and by using monthly data in 
attempts to adjust the data set to the period of collapse and derive more 
direct implications. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 
overviews the great trade collapse through literature surveys and Japa-
nese data, Section 3 deals with empirical investigation, and the last section 
concludes the paper.
2. Global trade collapse: literature review and the Japanese experience
　It is widely known that the financial crisis triggered by the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy and the successive simultaneous world recession 
lead to the unprecedentedly substantial shrinking of the world trade, and 
that the trade volume recovered relatively quickly in a couple of years af-
ter the incident. Plenty of research on the causes and mechanisms of this 
great trade collapse has been conducted. As Feenstra （2011） describes, 
the main points can be summarized in four aspects: decline of demand; in-
ventory adjustments; constraints of trade credit 1 ）; and disruption of sup-
ply chains. In this section, we will discuss the Japanese great trade col-
lapse along with the before mentioned aspects and beyond, by using 
monthly or quarterly data.
2-1. Exchange rate, exports, and imports during the trade collapse
　First, we will examine the overall trend of the exchange rate and inter-
national trade. Table 1 shows a percentage change in the yen-dollar ex-
change rate and the total exports and imports in value term, and the 
changes in import values, volumes, and unit prices of some sectors. During 
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the collapsed period, even though the yen appreciated, Japanese imports 
drastically fell. If we look at the sectoral data, we recognize that the motor 
vehicles sector encountered severe trade reductions （-82%）. This could be 
compared to other sectors like motor vehicles parts （-64%） and integrated 
circuit （-52%） sectors, whose import reductions were relatively smaller 
than the reduction of motor vehicles. Final goods or durable goods were 
faced with more severe damages than the intermediate goods.
　On the changes in import unit prices, we understand that the percent-
age decrease is bigger for motor vehicles than for motor vehicles parts or 
integrated circuits. It is therefore implied that part of the decrease in im-
Table 1. Reduction of Japanese Trade between August 2008 and February 2009
Exchange rate and trade percentage change
Nominal exchange rate （Japanese yen per US dollar） -16.43
Total exports （value） -49.95
Total imports （value） -53.04
　　　　　Imports by sector
Motor vehcles
Value -81.77
Volume- 76.89
unit price -21.11
Motor vehcles parts
Value -63.74
Volume -59.45
unit price -10.58
Integrated Circuits
Value -52.02
Volume -50.79
unit price -2.48
Crude petroleum
Value -74.04
Volume -6.86
unit price -72.13
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and Ministry of Finance, 
Trade Statistics of Japan.
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port values of final goods can be explained by the reduction of unit prices, 
whereas most of the decrease in values can be captured by the decrease 
of import volumes for intermediate goods. This is extended to the extreme 
case: crude petroleum. Almost all of the percentage decrease in the import 
value can be explained by the decrease in import unit price. As Levchen-
ko, Lewis, and Tesar （2010） and Feenstra （2011） point out the importance 
of the role of intermediate input trade, a composition of trade matters 
when explaining the Japanese global trade collapse as well.
2-2. Trend in GDP, consumption, and inventory
　Next, we look at Figure 2, which shows the trend of the Japanese real 
GDP and consumption. The decline of the real GDP during the trade col-
lapse was huge; the magnitude was greater than the GDP decrease when 
the earthquake and tsunami disasters occurred in March of 2011. Com-
Figure 2. Japanese Real GDP and Consumption （right scale）: 2006Q1-2012Q4
Sources: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, National Accounts of Japan
Notes: Quarterly data, seasonally adjusted.
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pared to the GDP, Japanese consumption did not fall as much as the GDP 
did, but its growth rate was negative 2.3 percent between the second 
quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. These declines of the real 
GDP and domestic consumption can well explain the great trade collapse 
of Japan as well as of the world, as in literature, the reduction of demand 
for durable manufactured goods accounts for more than 80 percent of the 
decrease of world trade per GDP （Feenstra, 2011）.
　Inventory adjustments are also one of the strong factors of the decrease 
in trade. When final demand is weak due to severe recession, manufactur-
ers tend to reduce production and instead increase sales of final goods and 
the use of intermediate goods out of inventories. Figure 3 shows the trend 
in Japanese inventory changes. The value drastically decreased during the 
trade collapse; especially in the first quarter of 2009 it dropped into nega-
tive numbers. Thus, the decline of Japanese trade may have reflected the 
Figure 3. Inventory Changes: 2006Q1-2012Q4 
Sources: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, National Accounts of Japan
Notes: Quarterly data, seasonally adjusted.
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inventory adjustments.
2-3. Trade finance, vertical linkages, and exchange rate
　In literature, some studies particularly focus on banks’ health as an im-
portant determinant of international trade, which is referred to as trade 
credit condition （Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein, 2011; Amiti and Weinstein, 
2011; Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2010）. The extent of the ease of bor-
rowing external capital matters when firms engage in exporting and/or 
importing, because trade costs more than domestic sales. Since the finan-
cial or banking crisis is likely to increase external capital costs, this would 
make it difficult to raise short-term funds for banks. Thus, firms are faced 
with credit constraint and they are not able to export without such funds 
even though they want to engage in exports. Using Japanese data, Ahn, 
Amiti and Weinstein found that trade credit conditions became very tight 
when the crisis happened, and that Japanese exports decreased more than 
domestic sales.
　Trade finance is defined differently from trade credit. Useful measures 
of this are developed as a health of a bank. Ahn et al （2011） uses the in-
terbank lending rate, Levchenko et al （2010） defines the weighted inter-
bank lending rate as a weight for U.S. trade shares, and Amiti and Wein-
stein （2011） examines the market-to-book value of a bank. Levchenko and 
others did not obtain clear evidence that U.S. imports from countries that 
experienced hard credit crunch fell.
　During the lost decades, Japanese monetary policy was eased to stimu-
late the economy and was expected to achieve positive inflation rate. As a 
result, interest rate has been kept very close to zero and quantitative eas-
ing rather than interest rate policies are beginning to adopt. The low in-
terest rate suggests that the borrowing or deposit rate should be low for 
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the majority of banks, whereas the lending rate could be high or low de-
pending on the profit performance of a bank. This study constructs and 
uses a new measure for bank’s health as follows: A bank with good perfor-
mance could lend money to the public at relatively lower rate, while a 
bank with poor performance has no other way but setting the lending rate 
higher. Accordingly, the difference can be considered as a measure of the 
bank’s or the money market health conditions. We define the measure, BH, 
for an overall country’s financing conditions as the difference between 
lending rate （L） and deposit rate （D） divided by lending rate （L）: BH = 
（L - D）/L, where a lower BH means better financing conditions while a 
higher BH means worse financing conditions. 2 ）
Figure 4.  Lending-Deposit Rate and Inflation Rate （CPI, right axis, %） in Japan: 
January 2006 – December 2012
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Notes: The lending-deposit rates are calculated by dividing the difference between the lending 
rate （L） and the deposit rate （D） by the lending rate （L）. Inflation rates are the percentage 
change in CPI （Consumer Price Index） consisting of all items over the previous year.
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　Figure 4 plots the lending-deposit rate （bank’s health measure, BH, 0 < 
BH < 1） together with the inflation rate （Consumer Price Index, CPI）. 
The bank’s health measure basically shows a cyclical movement, but obvi-
ously it hit a peak during the trade collapse. As Amiti, Weinstein and oth-
ers have shown, this measure also implies that the tightened trade finance 
condition plays a role in trade contraction. The hypothesis shall be empiri-
cally tested in the next section. During the same period of time, the infla-
tion rate drastically dropped from positive rates to negative ones.
　Research on the disruption of vertical production linkages has been able 
to find meaningful implications for the trade collapse. Multinational firms 
have developed production networks over many countries, which acceler-
ated trade in intermediate inputs as a form of intra-firm trade. However, a 
firm with the headquarter function located in a crisis-hit country is very 
likely to reduce production and therefore decrease imports of intermediate 
inputs. It is evidenced that those industries with higher imported-input in-
tensity tend to decrease imports （Levchenko et al, 2010）.
　The vertical production network reflects firms’ decision making on 
whether to outsource or not. When the production cost of a particular part 
is very expensive for the manufacturer, it tends to outsource the part pro-
duction to an outside special supplier. This production relationship is usu-
ally governed by a contract, and thus price and volume changes would not 
be so quick, even if a negative shock happened. The impact on trade in 
specific parts is of concern, but will be explored in future study.
　To the extent that the imports of intermediate inputs depend on the do-
mestic level of final good production, decline of final good production most 
likely reduces imported intermediate inputs. Indices for manufacturing, 
electronic products, motor vehicles, passenger cars, electric parts, and mo-
tor vehicles parts are depicted in Figure 5. Obviously all of the production 
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levels sharply declined during the trade collapse, which implies drastic de-
crease in imported inputs. Compared to the line for manufacturing, the 
lines for motor vehicles and for their parts go down well below. Thus the 
damage placed on the motor vehicles industry can be regarded as far big-
ger than the manufacturing average. The negative impacts, however, are 
more pronounced for motor vehicles production after the earthquake and 
tsunami hit in March 2011, in the north-east region of Japan. 3 ）
　Turning to the movements of the nominal effective exchange rate 
（NEER） and real effective exchange rate （REER） of the Japanese yen de-
picted in Figure 6, one can see that both NEER and REER rose very 
sharply during the trade collapse. By construction, these indices show that 
when the number increases, the currency is appreciated. Rigorously 
speaking, the yen’s REER is an overall purchasing power of the currency 
relative to the world, or all countries with which Japan trades. 
Figure 5. Trend in Japanese Industrial Production Index:
Selected Sectors, January 2006 - December 2012, 2010=100
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
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　Before the Lehman Brothers incident, the nominal rate of the yen was 
relatively weaker due to the Government’s low interest rate policy and 
carry trade （UNCTAD, 2009）. The yen was borrowed by foreign inrestors 
in Japan, where the interest rate was very low, and the investors ex-
changed the yen with foreign currencies with which they invested for 
projects with higher expected returns in other countries. Thus, the supply 
of the yen increased in the foreign exchange market and the yen likely de-
preciated. After the financial crisis, however, the yen began appreciating.
　The Figure also shows that NEER caught up with REER as time 
passed, which means that the nominal rate increased faster than the real 
rate. Based on the definition of the real exchange rate, this suggests that 
the inflation rate is relatively lower in Japan than the average rate of infla-
Figure 6.  Evolution of Japanese Nominal Effective Exchange Rate （NEER） and 
Real Effective Exchange Rate （REER）: January 2006 - December 2012, 
2010=100
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Notes: By construction, for both NEER and REER, the Japanese yen appreciates when the index 
goes up.
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tion of the world. 4 ）
3. Empirical investigation
　Levchenko et al （2010） and Feenstra （2011） mentioned that the main 
contributing factor of world trade contraction at this time was the reduc-
tion of demand, which could account for 80 percent of the decrease. But, 
the exception was Japan and China, where other factors such as trade 
credit constraints, were also important. Levchenko and others examined 
those factors together and found that trade composition and vertical link-
ages explained U.S. trade much better than the trade credit constraint. In 
this section, we reexamine the determinant factors of the great Japanese 
trade collapse by using monthly macro-economic data.
3-1. Empirical specification and data
　The purpose of this empirical analysis is to see which factors of the 
trade collapse are significant, and which are not. We use export/import 
volume index as a dependent variable. In the previous section, we argued 
the factors suggested by the literature. It would be desirable if we could 
use the variables as such, but mostly we have to use proxies for them, 
since our analysis is based on monthly data.
　The volume indices of exports and imports are downloaded from the 
IMF, International Financial Statistics （IFS）. Industrial production indices 
（INDPROD^） are used as a proxy for domestic demand and obtained 
from the IFS. Although domestic demand is defined as a sum of consump-
tion and investment, unfortunately the data is not available on the monthly 
basis in the National Account. Similarly, inventory adjustments might be 
important, but the monthly data is not available in the National Account, 
and then we decided to omit this variable from estimation equation.
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　Multinational enterprises are spreading production networks over coun-
tries by increasing foreign direct investment （FDI）. In this research, the 
FDI stock （FDI^） is used as a proxy for vertical linkages. When the FDI 
stock is higher, the vertical linkages are deepened and the effect of disrup-
tion of the linkages on trade would be larger. The end of FDI stock value 
for 2005 is obtained from JETRO, and monthly FDI outflow data are ob-
tained from Ministry of Finance. Then, we construct the monthly FDI 
stock data by first adding the outflow value of January 2006 to the 2005 
end-of stock value, and thereafter repeating the addition month-by-month.
　The real effective exchange rate （REER） comes from the IFS, which is 
defined as per yen. As in the previous section, the yen appreciates when 
REER goes up. The spread ratio of lending and deposit interest rates 
（BNKHLTH^） is the proxy for trade finance. A higher ratio implies over-
all poor performance in the banking sector, and the degree of constraint of 
trade finance becomes tighter. The lending and deposit interest rates are 
obtained from the IFS. Consumer price index （CPI^） is used for price lev-
el. GDP deflator might be a better index, but again, the monthly data are 
not available. Sales of manufacturing and trade in the U.S. （USSALE^） are 
used as a proxy for the world economic condition. The data is CMRMT 
U.S. Sales （Real Manufacturing and Trade Industries Sales） and obtained 
from Federal Reserve Economic Data.
3-2. Estimation results
（1） Relatively larger sample case
　Table 2 presents the estimation results using the data set of a relatively 
longer period （January 2007 to December 2012）. All of the variables are in 
the form of percentage change over the same month in previous year. The 
coefficient of Industrial production （INDPROD^）, proxy for domestic de-
現代経営経済研究　第 5巻第 2号90
mand, is positive and statistically significant for both export and import 
estimations. The magnitude is largest among explanatory variables, and 
thus the past study’s result which showed that the demand factor is the 
most important is reassured for Japanese trade.
　FDI stock （FDI^）, proxy for vertical linkages, is negative but not statis-
tically significant in the export model （model 1）. In the import model, on 
the contrary, this variable has negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cients. Since the vertical integration is deepened more, Japanese imports 
will decrease more when the disruption of linkages occurs.
　The coefficient of real effective exchange rate （REER^） is negative in 
the export estimation while positive in the import estimation, and all of the 
estimates are statistically significant. These results are consistent with the 
basic theory: the yen’s appreciation leads to a decrease in Japanese ex-
ports and increase in the imports.
　The estimates of the proxy variable for trade finance （BNKHLTH^） are 
positive and significant in the export estimation, and they are negative but 
not significant in the import estimation. The predicted sign is negative, 
but the opposite result is obtained: Japanese exports decrease as the con-
straint of export finance improves. This contradiction should be resolved, 
but we will leave this for future analysis.
　The coefficient of price index （CPI^） is statistically significant only for 
imports. The sign is positive, meaning that deflation is associated with im-
port reduction. The proxy for the world economic conditions, sales in the 
U.S. （USSALE^） has significant estimates that are negative in the export 
estimation and positive in the import estimation. These results are, again, 
opposite to the prediction. How to interpret them will be left for future re-
search.
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（2） Small sample case
　Table 3 represents the estimation results using small sample limited to 
the period of the great trade collapse and some more months before and 
after it. The demand factor （INDPROD^） is the most important, reassur-
ing the common view for Japanese trade. Vertical integration now has 
Table 2. Determinants of Japanese World Trade, January 2007 to December 2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent Variable: Percentage change in volume index over previous year
Coefficient Exports Exports Imports Imports
Constant 5.65* 6.51** 7.43*** 7.61***
（1.75） （2.10） （3.22） （3.55）
INDPROD^ 151.11*** 150.45*** 54.57*** 54.66***
（16.33） （16.32） （8.29） （8.38）
FDI^ -21.08 -24.60* -34.19*** -35.10***
（-1.43） （-1.73） （-3.27） （-3.67）
REER^ -32.53** -32.69** 22.74** 21.60**
（-2.23） （-2.24） （2.19） （2.42）
BNKHLTH^ 12.19** 10.98** -0.80
（2.38） （2.22） （-0.22）
CPI^ -0.76 1.21** 1.18**
（-0.93） （2.07） （2.10）
USSALE^ -73.66** -76.76** 41.20* 39.95*
（-2.44） （2.56） （1.92） （1.94）
Adj. R-squared 0.899 0.899 0.820 0.823
F statistics 105.8 127.0 55.0 67.0
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
Notes:  The sample period spans from January 2007 to December 2012. Monthly data is estimated 
by OLS. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratio. The asterisks show: *** as 1% level of signifi-
cance; ** as 5% level of significance; and * as 10% level of significance. The dependent vari-
able is a percentage change in the index of trade volume over the previous year, for either 
exports or imports. The explanatory variables are mostly proxies of the determinant fac-
tors suggested by the literature and all calculated as a percentage change over previous 
year. INDPROD^ means the change in the Japanese industrial production index as a proxy 
for domestic demand. FDI^ shows the change in the stock of Japanese outward FDI, im-
plying the degree of vertical integration. REER^ is the change in Japanese yen’s real effec-
tive exchange rate with higher value representing yen appreciation. BNKHLTH^ is the 
lending-deposit ratio as a proxy for bank’s health, the extent that trade finance is con-
strained. CPI^ is an inflation rate based on a consumer price index, and USSALE^ shows 
the change in U.S. sales as a proxy for world demand. 
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negative and statistically significant estimates in the export equation. By 
limiting the sample, a more direct effect of the disruption of vertical link-
ages on exports is obtained. Exporters with more FDI stock resort to 
more vertical networks in production and trade, and so that once the net-
Table 3.  Determinants of Japanese World Trade with Focus on the Great Trade 
Collapse Period, January 2007 to December 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent Variable: Percentage change in volume index over previous year
Coefficient Exports Exports Imports Imports
Constant 21.81*** 19.30*** 9.89 9.77*
（3.31） （3.74） （1.37） （1.70）
INDPROD^ 127.75*** 132.58*** 70.23*** 69.16***
（7.47） （13.61） （3.75） （-6.47）
FDI^ -76.28*** -66.19*** -42.79 -42.88**
（-3.30） （-3.57） （-1.69） （-2.06）
REER^ -27.63** -20.98* 17.25 15.10
（-2.10） （-1.95） （-1.20） （-1.43）
BNKHLTH^ 9.65** 10.68*** -1.45
（2.74） （3.18） （-0.38）
CPI^ 0.95 1.60** 1.55**
（1.49） （2.28） （2.54）
USSALE^ -7.50 0.51
（-0.17） （0.01）
Adj. R-squared 0.962 0.960 0.789 0.802
F statistics 146.7 213.0 22.9 36.4
No. of observations 36 36 36 36
Notes:  The sample period spans from January 2007 to December 2009. Monthly data is estimated 
by OLS. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratio. The asterisks show: *** as 1% level of signifi-
cance; ** as 5% level of significance; and * as 10% level of significance. The dependent vari-
able is a percentage change in the index of trade volume over the previous year, for either 
exports or imports. The explanatory variables are mostly proxies of the determinant fac-
tors suggested by the literature and all calculated as a percentage change over previous 
year. INDPROD^ means the change in the Japanese industrial production index as a proxy 
for domestic demand. FDI^ shows the change in the stock of Japanese outward FDI, im-
plying the degree of vertical integration. REER^ is the change in Japanese yen’s real effec-
tive exchange rate with higher value representing yen appreciation. BNKHLTH^ is the 
lending-deposit ratio as a proxy for bank’s health, the extent that trade finance is con-
strained. CPI^ is an inflation rate based on a consumer price index, and USSALE^ shows 
the change in U.S. sales as a proxy for world demand.
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work is disconnected, exports will decrease. This empirical association is 
not obtained from the analysis of the longer data in sub-seetion （1）. 
　The real effective exchange rate （REER^） has negative and statistically 
significant estimates in the export models, which assures that the real yen 
appreciation does have an impact on the export collapse. In the import 
equation, on the other hand, the estimates are positive but not statistically 
significant. This is also suggesting that there should be another factor in 
Japanese importing behavior during the collapse. Trade in intermediate in-
puts may be better explained by the intra-firm trade and outsourcing the-
ory, which has different implications for trade （Grossman and Helpman, 
2003; Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2005）. Concerning the trade finance 
proxy （BNKHLTH^）, the estimates are again positive in the export equa-
tion. A further investigation is necessary on this regard.
4. Conclusion
　The objective of this study is to examine the impact of financial crisis in 
2008 on Japanese trade. The impact on trade is actually so significant that 
the situation has been named great trade collapse. In the literature, four 
factors of the world trade collapse were detected. Thus, in this study we 
attempted to reexamine those factors more directly by using Japanese 
macro-economic monthly data. It has been reassured that the reduction of 
demand and disruption of vertical linkages are clearly the important con-
tributing factors for the explanation of Japanese trade. Our new measure 
of the constraint of trade finance unfortunately has had an opposite sign 
for exports, but it is implied that there should be some connections be-
tween exporters and their financiers as mentioned by Amiti and Weinstein 
（2011）. Further investigation on this issue will be a future research topic. 
　In the past studies, the role of the exchange rate has not been fully con-
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sidered in the context of great trade collapse. This study directly deals 
with it and makes suggestions that the real yen appreciation should be as-
sociated with the decline of Japanese exports during the collapsed period. 
This can be considered as one of our contributions to the literature. On 
the import side, the estimates are not significant. There may be vertical 
integration and outsourcing behavior of Japanese firms behind the rela-
tionship between trade and exchange rate, and therefore, further investi-
gation is necessary. 
　Since our research is based on monthly data, there are a lot of data re-
strictions. We especially omitted inventory adjustment data. Shioji and 
Uchino （2011） suggest that inventory adjustment in the motor vehicles in-
dustry is particularly important during the collapse period. We have to 
consider a model including inventory adjustments in the future. We also 
have to use proxies. This means that there is a possibility that some of the 
interpretations of the results may have been interpreted differently. In a 
future study we would like to improve this issue. 
Notes
1 ）　Trade credit is a conceptually different term from trade finance. Refer to 
Amiti and Weinstein （2011） for the explanation. This study uses the term, 
trade finance.
2 ）　Better performed banks could raise the deposit rate, which means again, 
the smaller the difference is, the better the bank’s health is.
3 ）　The analysis based on the incomplete contract model about the Japanese 
motor vehicles industry after the earthquake can be seen in Tanaka 
（2013）, for example. 
4 ）　Consider the formula of relative purchasing power parity condition in 
logarithms: qˆ / yen＝ê / yen＋Pˆ JP－Pˆ world, where qˆ / yen is the real effective ex-
change rate represented by per yen, ê / yen is the nominal effective exchange 
rate represented by per yen, Pˆ JP and Pˆworld are the price levels of Japan 
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and the world, respectively. The symbol, hat （^） shows that the variable is 
represented as a percentage change. When the change in the nominal rate 
is bigger than the change in the real rate, the inflation rate must be higher 
in the world than in Japan.
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